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Abstract
Ockham's razor is a heuristic concept applied in philosophy of science to
decide between two or more feasible physical theories. Ockham's razor
operates by deciding in favour of the theory with least assumptions and
concepts; roughly speaking, the less complex theory. Could Ockham's
razor not easily treat the different interpretations as theories and decide
in favour of the one with fewest assumptions? We provide an answer
to this question by means of examples of applications in literature and
the discussion of its historical origin. We review the historical context
of Ockham's razor and its connection to medieval philosophical struggles,
discuss the essence of its parsimonious core and put it in relation with
modern struggles in the context of interpretational issues in Quantum
Mechanics. Due to the lack of experimental evidences in string theory, a
new field of modern heuristics arose in the last years. We will discuss these
heuristics in the context of Ockham-related heuristic methods and analyse
the connection of these heuristics with the interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics.
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1 Introduction
The interpretations of Quantum Mechanics are up to now matter of philosophical-
physical debates. One philosophical concept that is often stressed during debates
about interpretational issues in Quantum Mechanics is Ockham's 1 razor, or the
principle of parsimony.
Gu et al. [2011] give a good example how Ockham's razor is usually perceived
in science:
“Occam's razor, the principle that plurality is not to be posited with-
out necessity, is an important heuristic that guides the development
of theoretical models in quantitative science.”
To get a deeper understanding about the significance of Ockham's razor, an
overview about the historical context and environment is needed to under-
stand the origins of his razor principle. Ockham's comprehensive work covers
logic, theology, politics, epistemology and philosophy, although today he is best
known for his parsimony principle. With his philosophical position, nowadays
called nominalism2, he encountered the problem of universals, which dominated
the philosophy of the Middle Ages. The problem of universals is the question
whether a general property or quality, like the colour “red” or the term “ap-
ple,” has an existence on its own or if it is only a name for a certain property
of an individual object [Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2000]. We will discuss the problem
of universals in more detail at a later stage of this work, but one can already
safely say that it still has relevance in modern philosophy; for example, in the
philosophy of mathematics, where we operate with numbers as philosophical
entities.
In Quantum Mechanics, Ockham's razor has been used in literature in the inter-
pretational debates as reason to favour specific interpretations. We will give an
insight into the historical and philosophical environment where Ockham's razor
had its origins, and discuss how the principle usually is used in reasoning in the
quantum-mechanical context to discuss its applicability in Quantum Mechanics.
First of all, we would like to clarify a still widely spread mistake. The usu-
ally cited phrases for Ockham's razor concept are not by William of Ockham,
they are artifacts of translations, summarizations and simplifications done by
successors. A detailed analysis of this myth around Ockham's razor has been
given by Thorburn [1918]. He gives a comprehensive collection of all original
quotations concerning Ockham's parsimony principle, for which we will provide
a translation and detailed discussion in section 2.3.
1In this work, we will use the wording “Ockham” instead of “Occam”. In the literature,
both can be found.
2We use the term Nominalism for Ockham's position on the problem of universals. Nomi-
nalism is usually a much broader concept and contains several discriminable ideas[Beckmann,
1998]; [Goodman and Quine, 1947].
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2 Ockhams philosophy in historical context
In this section, we provide an overview of the historical context and environment
to understand the origins of Ockham's razor principle. William of Ockham was
a Franciscan friar that lived between 1287 and 1347. He received a theological
education in the Franciscan order at the London convent, and later in Oxford,
but he never completely finished with a master of theology, though he fulfilled all
requirements. It is believed that this was due to his controversial views, which
antagonized some of his fellows and superiors, and to some conflicts between
the Franciscan order and Pope John XXII.
Following Beckmann [1995], Ockham's philosophy is pervaded by three ma-
jor principles: The omnipotence principle, the contradiction principle, and the
parsimony principle. All three of them have strong interrelations and a deep
theological connection. This theological context plays no role for our applica-
tion of Ockham's razor onto physics, but is important to understand Ockham's
epistemological ideas in the context they were created.
It is important to note that these principles have never been set and classified
by Ockham himself, and this classification is not used in literature universally.
Nevertheless, these principles provide a good overview of the ideas of Ockham,
which is the reason for us to make use of them here.3
2.1 The omnipotence principle
The omnipotence principle describes the omnipotence of the theological entity
god and his unrestricted ability to act as he wishes to do. In Ockham's own
words [of Ockham, 2012, OT VII, 45]:
“Deus nullus est debitor.” or “God is no one's debtor.”4
Following Beckmann [1995] Ockham's god is nearly unrestricted in his actions
to create the world according to his will and free to change it as he wishes.
Although the theological entity god cannot act completely unrestricted, there is
one restriction: god is not able to act contradictory, and nothing in his creation is
allowed to be contradictory. With this idea Ockham encountered the philosophy
of necessitarianism, which had its origins in the work of Aristotle and Platon,
where all things exist due to necessity and therefore our world as it exists is the
only possible one. In a theological context, Ockham's position was radical and
new, and was one of several reasons for Ockham's conflict with censorship and
the papal court [Beckmann, 1998]; [Klocker, 1996].
As mentioned before, the restriction of the entity god is contradiction: this
is settled in the second principle. For further details on this topic, refer to
[Schro¨cker, 2003].
3By analysing Ockham's original writings, it is clear that no such structure of principles is
defined there. [Beckmann, 1995] emphasizes that as well
4Translation by Gerd Ch. Krizek
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2.2 The contradiction principle
Ockham's contradiction principle is a continuation of the aristotelian theory of
thought. Aristotle formulated this first principle in the following way [Ross,
1928]:
“It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and
not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.”
In Ockham's epistemology, the idea is continued in the sense that contradic-
tions cannot even be purpose of knowledge and perception. Perceptibility and
contradictoriness exclude each other in principle, according to Ockham. The
striking point is not that this idea is new, but that this is Ockham's starting
point to aim for nominalism; this is his way to handle the problem of universals.
As outlined before, the problem of universals is the question if wether general
terms like the colour “red” have an ontological existence on their own. If this
would be affirmed, “redness” would be a qualia on its own. The problem of
universals got discussed over the centuries until even now. Famous participants
were Kant, Peirce, Russel, Whitehead and Wittgenstein [Kant, 1889];[Peirce,
1974];[Whitehead and Russell, 1912];[Wittgenstein, 1994].
Ockham handles the problem of universals in his comments on the “Four books
of Sentences” by Peter Lombard, which was a standard exercise for every me-
dieval theologian. The scholastic tradition dominated the medieval theology. It
was based on the dialectical method, where a question is formulated, arguments
against and in favour of a statement were discussed and replies to the objections
were given. An analysis of this scholastic method, as an example by Ockham
himself, can be found in Appendix A.
With his nominalist position Ockham argues that the objects of our perception
in the world are individuals; they are unique and it is not necessary to use the
concept of universals to describe these objects. Moreover, the universals are not
entities that are necessarily needed; they are connected to the construction of
language and the way how the human mind perceives and processes the world.
The antithetic concept to nominalism is realism. It is important to distinguish
this definition of realism, which only refers to the dispute on universals, from
the realism concepts in philosophy of science such as the naive realism or the
scientific realism. The realists position concerning the problem of universals
assigns an objective existence to universals and goes back to the ideas of Platon.
Therefore, the realist position is often called Platonism or Platonic realism,
even though these concepts have several differences. Regarding the problem
of universals, their position is identical; thus, we will stick to this naming and
subsequently refer to this position as Platonic realism.
Now we will show how the contradiction principle plays an important role in
Ockham's reasoning against Platonic realism.
4
Following [Scho¨nberger, 1990, p.105] Ockham's way of arguing is like this:
“2 contradictory statements, if they should both be true at the same
time, can only refer to two different things. And vice versa: Wher-
ever something distinguishable occurs, contradiction can be claimed.
Therefore a designated contradiction, if its contradictory contents
can refer to distinguishable things, is a ground-breaking argument
for Distinguishability or Difference.”
Or with Ockham's own words [of Ockham, 2012, OTh II, Liber I, D.2 Q.6, page
174]:
“contradictio est via potissima ad probandum distinctionem rerum.”
or
“Contradiction is the most important way to prove difference.”5
The contradiction principle should be understood as an attack on the concept of
universals and intercessor of nominalism. Let us discuss how this is done with
the help of a Gedankenexperiment.
Figure 1: The objects in the boxes
Let us assume a box where a person examines the content of the box two times.
In between the process of looking for the properties of the content, it should
be possible that someone secretly replaces the objects in the box with different
ones. The question is if whether the objects in the box at the two times are
identical. The objects we assume in our Gedankenexperiment have properties
A and B; for convenient illustration, let it be colour and shape. Furthermore,
we assume both properties A and B are dichotomic, so for colour there are only
to possible states red or green; for shape let it be round or angled.
5Translation by Gerd Ch. Krizek
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The following Illustration shows the properties (qualia) of the assumed objects.
Figure 2: The qualia of the objects
If the person controls the boxes twice, as defined, out of the 16 possible combi-
nations, the following cases might occur:
Figure 3: 4 of 16 possible combinations
(a)
colour1 = red colour2 = green
shape1 = angled shape2 = round
colour1 6= colour2
shape1 6= shape2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(b)
colour1 = red colour2 = red
shape1 = angled shape2 = round
shape1 6= shape2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(c)
colour1 = red colour2 = green
shape1 = angled shape2 = angled
6
colour1 6= colour2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(d)
colour1 = red colour2 = red
shape1 = angled shape2 = angled
No contradiction
↪→ IDENTITY
By the fact that there is a contradiction in the statements about the properties
of the objects in the box at the two times, difference for the objects can be
concluded. The conclusion is: Because of the contradiction, difference can be
supposed. On the other hand, by perceiving no contradiction in the properties,
it is reasonable to conclude identity for the objects.
In this last example, we avoided making use of universals; now let's introduce
the concept of universals and add them to our Gedankenexperiment. Additional
to our dichotomic properties A and B, we assume that the universal “toybrick”
should be applicable to all of our objects. It is important to see that univerals
are not properties in general and therefore not per se perceptible to our observer.
(a)
colour1 = red colour2 = green
shape1 = angled shape2 = round
universal1 = toybrick universal2 = toybrick
colour1 6= colour2
shape1 6= shape2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(b)
colour1 = red colour2 = red
shape1 = angled shape2 = round
universal1 = toybrick universal2 = toybrick
shape1 6= shape2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
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(c)
colour1 = red colour2 = green
shape1 = angled shape2 = angled
universal1 = toybrick universal2 = toybrick
colour1 6= colour2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(d)
colour1 = red colour2 = red
shape1 = angled shape2 = angled
universal1 = toybrick universal2 = toybrick
No contradiction
↪→ IDENTITY
As we see, adding the universal “toybrick” makes no difference to our conclusions
on difference and identity. The reason is that all objects were attributed with
the same universal. Let's assume that two toybrick manufacturers produce
toybricks with our binary dichotomic properties A and B, colour (in red and
green) and shape. Let them be LEGO c© and KNEX c©. Now let us assume that
the vicious person that wants to puzzle our experimenter, who is examining the
properties of the objects in the boxes, always replaces a LEGO c© toybrick at
the first check with a KNEX c© toybrick for the second examination.
(a)
colour1 = red colour2 = green
shape1 = angled shape2 = round
universal1 = LEGO c© universal2 = KNEX c©
colour1 6= colour2
shape1 6= shape2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
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(b)
colour1 = red colour2 = red
shape1 = angled shape2 = round
universal1 = LEGO c© universal2 = KNEX c©
shape1 6= shape2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(c)
colour1 = red colour2 = green
shape1 = angled shape2 = angled
universal1 = LEGO c© universal2 = KNEX c©
colour1 6= colour2
↪→ DIFFERENCE
(d)
colour1 = red colour2 = red
shape1 = angled shape2 = angled
universal1 = LEGO c© universal2 = KNEX c©
No contradiction
↪→ IDENTITY
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We see, in fact, that in fact the universal assigned to an object with identical
properties might be different, but there is no way to distinguish them. There-
fore in Ockham's view it makes no sense to speak about the reality of those
universals; they do not seem connected to the real world, if they do not reside
in distinguishable properties of the objects. Furthermore, it would be possible
to multiply them easily. If the toybrick belongs to Sarah, you could assign it
a new universal, “Sarah's toybrick,” and so on. This numberless amount of
universals that would then reside in reality, in the view of Platonic Realism,
was unneccessary to Ockham. It is not useful to introduce more entities than
necessary.
This is the essence of Ockham's Parsimony principle, and one recognizes the
strong connection to the Contradiction principle. In Ockhams own words
[of Ockham, 2012, OP I,SL I,12] or here [von Ockham, 1996, SL I,12 page 58]:
“Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora.”
“For nothing is done with a multiplicity, what can be done with
less.”6
We will discuss the Parsimony principle in more detail in section 2.3.
6Translation by Gerd Ch. Krizek
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2.3 The parsimony principle
The parsimony principle is the heuristic method that is meant when people
speak of Ockham's razor. There are several formulations in the literature which
are not originally by Ockham himself. Furthermore, it is not the case that there
is a specific writing of Ockham where he states this principle as fundamental
and assigns deeper relevance to it (although it is anchored in his whole thinking
and pervades his philosophical and theological works). One original formulation
can be found here [of Ockham, 2012, OP I,SL I,12] or here [von Ockham, 1996,
SL I,12 p.58]:
“Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora.”
We may translate this sentence as
“For nothing is done with a multiplicity, what can be done with
less.”7
or in more modern words
“It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer.”8
Several other formulations used in modern literature are not by Ockham him-
self. Thorburn [1918] clarified the question around the formulation and gives
a comprehensive overview about formulations of the parsimony principle, but
only in Latin. To illustrate the idea in its historical context, it makes sense to
give translations9:
(a) “A multiplicity may never be stated without necessity.”
(b) “...multiplicity may not be stated, but for it is necessary .”
(c) “This opinion states a multiplicity without necessity, which is
against the doctrine of philosophers.”
(d) “As somebody who follows the common sense does not state mul-
tiplicity, but for that what is included by common sense, somebody
that follows Believe may not state more than the truth of Believe
requires.”
(e) “The use of multiplicity must obviously always be necessary.”
(f) “For nothing is done with a multiplicity, what can be done with
less.”
(g) “Stringency should be posed, where multiplicity is not necessary.”
7Translation by Gerd Ch. Krizek
8Translation by Gerd Ch. Krizek
9Translation Josef Reiter and Gerd Ch. Krizek
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Out of these passages and the context of the other principles we can conclude:
• As shown in Section 2.2, the contradiction principle plays an important
role in Ockham's arguments in favour of his nominalism against the ex-
istence of the universals, which to him are numberless in principle. They
form the multiplicity he wanted to get rid of and where he applies the
razor principle.
• There is no statement against the existence of entities in general, nor does
the parsimony principle represent the view that entities have to fulfill some
extremum principle.
• The razor is no deep mystery to Ockham; it is just made of common
sense. It is a very hands-on principle, a principle of economy of thought
and resources.
• It is a principle of adequacy. Parsimony means not to reduce to a minimum
at all costs; it follows the truth, whatever that may be precisely in context
of physics10. Parsimony means to use as much as necessary and as less as
possible.
Out of this, we can conclude that Ockham's razor has no meaning as a strict
ontological principle; it is not meant to be applied to ontological entities. It is an
epistemological statement to minimize the number of symbols used to describe
a certain sensational experience.
It is again Wittgenstein who sums up the razor principle [Wittgenstein, 1994,
5.47321 and 3.328] in a comprehensible way:
“Occams maxim is, of course, not an arbitrary rule, nor one that is
justified by its success in practice: its point is that unnecessary units
in a sign-language mean nothing.”
“If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Occams
maxim.”
To Ockham, the universals represent such useless symbols that do not reside in
reality.
The notion of simplicity is strongly connected to Ockham's razor. It is often
referred to as a principle of simplicity. That is somehow misleading and should
be discussed in more detail. Simplicity is a very subjective criterion unless it
is somehow quantified by a measure. Often Ockham's razor is understood as
the concept that only simple explanations are the correct ones; in the context
of a theory, the simplest theory must be right. If that would be the case, in a
naive way it would be pretty easy to do science, but this is obviously not the
10In physics, the confirmation of the applicability of a certain model or theory is given by
experiment. Nature only gives an answer to the question on adequacy of a theory. In context
with experimentally not testable theories, some authors would see that statement as too strict.
Examples on this point of view will be given in chapter 3
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case. The simplicity goes only as far as possible. Adequacy and consensus with
the experiment are favored over simplicity. Physics does not describe the world
itself, it describes mental representations of experiences we conduct in the real
world. Therefore, the simplicity, if applicable, does not belong to the world, but
to the mental representation of the experiences. It is a comprehensible concept
that human minds select the simplest way to describe an experience by mental
representations. This concept is economical and parsimonious concerning the
limited resources of the human mind11, but it does not necessarily tells us more
about the things in reality. The success of science and its miracle, if you would
like to use the notion of the miracle argument, is that our mental representa-
tions deliver models with predictive power.
Wittgenstein emphasizes the subjective element of the parsimonious method
[Wittgenstein, 1994, 6.363 and 6.3631]:
“The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the sim-
plest law that can be reconciled with our experiences.
This procedure, however, has no logical justification but only a psy-
chological one.”
Others emphasize the connection between simplicity and truth. Kelly [2010] for-
malises the concept of Ockham's razor for truth finding and sets up an Ockham
efficiency argument. A detailed analysis of this ideas would go beyond the scope
of this work, but it can be seen ad hoc that the notion of truth is something
difficult in context with physics and science in general, and probably somehow
confined to some technical applications like machine learning, where it is clear
what is defined by the concept of truth.
We will be concerned with the notion of simplicity again in the context of the
interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, but finally we will present a biological
application of Ockham's razor and the notion of simplicity.
Westerhoff et al. [2009] argues in his justification for Systems Biology that
“Two paradigms, i.e. Ockham's razor and the prevalence of mini-
mum energy solutions are pertinent to much of physics ”
and referring to living organisms:
“For researching living organisms, Occams razor is not an appropri-
ate paradigm.”
... due to the high complexity and the high amount of constituents involved.
He somehow argues that you can speak about simplicity in the scale of ...
“two or three components, and if that does not work perhaps 6. Three
hundred and seventy-five is certainly not in the realm of simplicity.”
11For further details refer to [Tversky and Kahneman, 1973]
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The application of Ockham's razor in the regime of things in reality12 is not
the intended application by Ockham. Ockham's arguments are applicable for
mental representations that should fulfill the parsimony, not the things itself.
The application of Ockham's razor as a concept of parsimony or simplicity in
the things itself goes far beyond the ideas of Ockham, therefore, it would be
better to name efficiency concepts in different regimes than that intended by
Ockham, differently than “Ockham's razor”.
It would be an over simplification to reduce Ockham's thinking to a few princi-
ples and fairly simple conclusions; it would not meet Ockham's philosophy in all
its facets and subtleties, but for our purpose of a modern context it seems suf-
ficient and appropriate to demonstrate his ideas in context of those principles.
Further subtleties and the connection to the theological aspects13 are discussed
extensively in [Scho¨nberger, 1990]. For logical aspects of the contradiction prin-
ciple, refer to [Schick, 2010].
12Like a biological system
13 The contradiction principle has one more aspect worth mentioning, which is negligible
for the physical context of Ockham's razor, but still interesting for the historical embedding
of Ockham's philosophy and theology. The contradiction principle is in connection with the
omnipotence principle in the context that it even is impossible for the entity god to act in
contradictory ways.
A modern account of this idea has been given by [Wittgenstein, 1994, 3.031]:
“It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary
to the laws of logic. The truth is that we could not say what an “illogical” world
would look like.”
This principle was stressed mainly during disputes about Trinity, because of its inherent logical
contradiction [Beckmann, 1998].
14
3 Ockham and other heuristics
Before discussing the role of Ockham's razor in the interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics, we will give an overview over other heuristics connected to Ockham's
razor in recent physical debates.
No claim is made on completeness of the selection of heuristics presented here;
they have been chosen due to relevance for our discussion.
3.1 Machs economy of thought
Ernst Mach pleads for an idea of economy of thought, which emerged from his
works in philosophy of science. He takes the phenomenalistic point of view
that all our scientific reasoning is based on economy of thought, starting with
language, perception, and mathematics pervading all fields of scientific work.
By perceiving sensations of things in the world, classifying them into boxes14
and constructing laws out of their behavior, one does not gain knowledge about
the things itself, one merely connects the mental representations of the things
with laws [Mach, 1898]:
“It thus comes to pass that we form the notion of a substance dis-
tinct from its attributes, of a thing-in-itself, whilst our sensations
are regarded merely as symbols or indications of the properties of
this thing-in-itself. But it would be much better to say that bodies
or things are compendious mental symbols for groups of sensations,
symbols that do not exist outside of thought. Thus, the merchant re-
gards the labels of his boxes merely as indexes of their contents, and
not the contrary. He invests their contents, not their labels, with real
value.”
His economy of thought now relates to the mind-based processes where the laws
interconnect the mental representations of the things, the mental symbols, in an
economical way. So the economic character comes in by the perceiving subject
and its limitations. It is an economy of practicality, even in mathematics [Mach,
1898]:
“The greatest perfection of mental economy is attained in that sci-
ence which has reached the highest formal development, and which
is widely employed in physical inquiry, namely, in mathematics.
Strange as it may sound, the power of mathematics rests upon its
evasion of all unnecessary thought and on its wonderful saving of
mental operations. Even those arrangement-signs which we call num-
bers are a system of marvellous simplicity and economy. ... No one
will dispute me when I say that the most elementary as well as the
highest mathematics are economically-ordered experiences of count-
ing, put in forms ready for use.”
14The boxes mean the categories in which the sensations of things are sorted
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and further:
“Physics is experience, arranged in economical order.”
It can be clearly seen that the economy Mach proposes is connected to the
limited capacity or ability of the perceiving subject. It is therefore a practical
economy justified by human beings as operators of scientific methods, not an
economy settled in the things as they are. Economy is understood as conse-
quence of the development of predecessors of science, like handcraft or engineer-
ing, which made it necessary to transfer knowledge and experience. SI-units
are human-centric from their choice of scale; likewise, the economic nature of
physics resides in the economic nature of human language and thought.
For a more detailed analysis and different aspects of Machs economy of thought,
refer to [Kallfelz, 1929].
3.2 The No Alternative Argument
The No Alternative Argument says that despite intensive research, no alterna-
tive theories have been found to a specific theory or theory complex, this gives
an argument in favour of the specific theory. It sounds simple, but has been put
on a formal foundation in Dawid et al. [2014].
The argument of Dawid et al. refers to string theory to give justification in ab-
sence of empirical evidences. It is part of the idea of non-empirical evidences and
is connected to the Meta Inductive Argument and the Unexpected Explanation
Argument.
3.3 The Meta Inductive Argument
The Meta Inductive Argument is connected to the No Alternative Argument
and Scientific Underdetermination, where it is argued that the number of pos-
sible alternative theories to a specific theory is limited in principle (Scientific
Underdetermination [Dawid, 2007] and [Dawid, 2008]) and the No Alternative
Argument favors the specific one when there is a lack of alternative theories.
The Meta Inductive Argument says that if a specific theory has something in
common with theories that have been empirically confirmed, it is reasonable to
favor this specific theory [Dawid et al., 2014]:
“Now, assume that a novel theory H shows similarities to theories
H1, H2, etc., in the same scientific research program. The joint fea-
ture of these theories may be a certain theoretical approach, a shared
assumption, or any other relevant characteristic. Let us assume
that a substantial share of the theories to which H is similar have
been empirically confirmed. Assume further that for those theories,
we have empirically grounded posterior beliefs about the number of
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alternatives. Then, it seems reasonable to use these posteriors as
priors for the number of alternatives to H. After all, H is quite simi-
lar to H1, H2, etc. In statistics, such a way of grounding “objective”
prior beliefs in past experience is referred to as the empirical Bayes
method”
For Dawid et al. [2014] the Meta Inductive Argument is not working alone; it
has to be seen together with the No Alternatives Argument and the Unexpected
Explanation Argument.
3.4 The Unexpected Explanation Argument
The Unexpected Explanation Argument is not an empirical argument, nor
should it be mixed up with a novel empirical confirmation that supports a
certain theory.
The Unexpected Explanation Argument claims that a theory explains a different
theoretical content in a completely unexpected way or regime where the theory
has not been developed for [Dawid, 2015]:
“Theory H was developed in order to solve a specific problem. Once H
was developed, physicists found out that H also provides explanations
with respect to a range of problems which to solve was not the initial
aim of developing the theory.”
The idea of Non-Empirical Confirmations refers to the arguments presented in
3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 and uses them in combination to give justification to theories
that bear an inherent lack of empirical data. The arguments have been designed
for use in context with string theory, but Dawid et al. [2014] argue for application
in archaeology and palaeontology as well.
3.5 The Ontological Coherence Argument (OCA)
We would like to propose a new heuristic that might have been used, already
implicit in history of science, the Ontological Coherence Argument.
We claim that a theory consists of its mathematical apparatus, its physical
interpretation by labels and names, its interpretation by concepts and princi-
ples and an ontological embedding. The details of the definition of these four
levels of a physical theory will be discussed in a subsequent paper.
Theorem 1 Under the assumption of a set of Theories H, that cover different
regimes of physics, and that H are Theories in agreement with experimental data
in the respective regime, the OCA claims that those Theories OT ∈ H whose
ontologies fit coherently together are preferable.
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Figure 4: Levels of interpretation
The idea of OCA is not to rule out any discussed theory or interpretation within
the framework of Quantum Mechanics, but to encourage to look out for con-
nected theories outside of Quantum Mechanics to see if the puzzle of ontological
entities gives rise to a bigger picture. A historical example where the applica-
tion of the OCA can be seen applied is ”The Great Cosmological Controversy”
between the Geocentric, Heliocentric and Geoheliocentric model. Today it is
widely unkown that there were striking empirical arguments in favour of the
Geoheliocentric model by Tyho Brahe [Graney, 2010]. The empirical arguments
were telescopic measurements of star disks, which supported the Geoheliocen-
tric model by the assumption that stars should all have the same order of size.
It turned out later that the observed star disk was an optical artefact, an airy
disk caused by diffraction.
The picture of a new cosmology which connected to Isaac Newton's Principia
Mathematica was ontologically striking; the Heliocentric view connected seam-
less to the nature of gravity and the laws of motion. Not only was it satisfying
from the view of experimental confirmation, it was compatible through its on-
tologies. For further details, refer to [Kuhn, 1957].
The OCA points in the direction of scientific realism, where the ontology of
a theory plays a crucial role, and its connection to empiricism, instrumentalism,
phenomenalism and constructivism will be investigated in a formal language in
a subsequent work.
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4 Ockham and the interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics
There is a long tradition in struggles around the interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics, beginning in the 1920's, to argue with principles. One principle we
will discuss here, which showed up pretty late on the stage of interpretational
discussions, is Ockham's razor. Its appearance can be taken as an indication that
the discussion somehow stagnated due to a lack of new experimental evidence,
obdurate positions and a new generation of physicists.
In the following, we will present a collection of citations from papers and publi-
cations where Ockham's razor was applied. We will first present a short overview
of the interpretations involved, present the citations by order of their positions,
summarize the views and draw our conclusions.
4.1 Overview of interpretations used in the discussion
4.1.1 Copenhagen interpretation
The Copenhagen interpretation represents the view that the wavefunction, or
the state vector, of a system gives a complete description of the physical situ-
ation of a quantum mechanical system. The evolution of the wavefunction or
state vector is given by the Schro¨dinger equation. The measurement process of a
physical quantity is not described by the Schro¨dinger evolution, it is defined by
the projection postulate which assigns measurement outcomes to eigenvalues of
specific operators. This process is often called the collapse of the wavefunction,
because during a measurement process the unitary evolution of the wavefunction
is replaced by this non-unitary collapse. According to Copenhagen interpreta-
tion, this collapse occurs objectively random and the physical quantities have no
definite values before the measurement process. Furthermore, according to the
Copenhagen interpretation, it has no meaning at all to speak about the values
of a physical systems quantities prior to the measurement. The Copenhagen
interpretation is therefore a indeterministic15, non-realistic16 interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics.
15Indeterminism is the position that an event has no causal reason; it is the opposite of de-
terminism, where every event has causal reason. Both positions are connected to the concepts
of probability and free will.
16In this context, realism means that properties and quantities of physical systems have a
meaning and definite value prior to their measurement. Nonrealistic interpretations would
deny this assumption and claim that it makes no sense to speak about quantities of physical
systems prior to measurement.
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4.1.2 De Broglie-Bohm interpretation
The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is a realistic, deterministic, nonlocal17
hidden-variable interpretation and is based on the fact that the Schro¨dinger
equation can be interpreted as set of one real- and one complex valued equa-
tion. The complex-valued equation is interpreted as the conservation of proba-
bility, and the real-valued equation is interpreted as a Hamilton Jacobi equation,
with an extra term. This term is interpreted as a quantum potential. From the
Hamilton Jacobi equation an equation of motion for the particles can be derived,
which is called guidance equation. In the De-Broglie Bohm interpretation, non-
locality is an important and inherent feature of Quantum Mechanics.
4.1.3 Bohmian Mechanics
Advocates of Bohmian Mechanics claim that it is an independent theory based
on the ideas of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, but it postulates the guid-
ance equation for particles. In that view, it is not seen as an interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics, and the guidance equation is not seen as a consequence
of the Schro¨dinger equation. Bohmian Mechanics claims to be identical in all
experimental predictions with standard Quantum Mechanics and is a realistic,
deterministic, nonlocal hidden-variable theory. Its fundamental entities are the
particles and their positions.
4.1.4 Many Worlds interpretation
The Many Worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is a realistic determin-
istic interpretation that claims that the wave function is a complete description
of the quantum mechanical processes. Therefor no collapse of the wavefunc-
tion hypothesis is necessary to explain the measurement process. During the
measurement process a specific branch of the wavefunction emerges through the
measurement interaction.
4.1.5 QBism
QBism or Quantum Bettabilitarianism [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016] is a continua-
tion of the Copenhagen interpretation. It is the attempt to reconstruct Quan-
tum Mechanics on the basis of probabilities as representation of the subjective
degrees of belief of agents interacting with the world. The quantum state is
not seen as a foundational entity, it is merely a different way to represent the
probabilities. The Hilbert space is constructed out of SIC-POVMs which are
symmetric, informationally complete, positive operator-valued measures. They
generate the probabilities for the individual agents based on their subjective
beliefs according to the fundamental postulate that reproduces the Born rule
for the probabilities.
17Locality is the concept that events are independent of all events that are space-like sepa-
rated. Nonlocality abolishes this restriction and, therefore, events can have an instantaneous
influence on space-like separated events.
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QBism is a local theory, takes a realistic position (for a detailed account on
participatory realism, refer to [Fuchs, 2017]) and provides an epistemic inter-
pretation of the wavefunction.
4.1.6 Mathematical Universe Hypothesis
The MUH is a hypothesis and not an interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,
but it is connected to the Many Worlds interpretation, since the Many Worlds
interpretation is contained in the MUH. The MUH claims that mathematical
objects form the only external reality. It naturally explains Wigner's Unreason-
able Effectiveness of Mathematics [Wigner, 1960].
4.2 In favor of De Broglie-Bohm Interpretation and Bohmian
mechanics - against Copenhagen interpretation
Detlef Du¨rr [Esfeld, 2012, p.116] argues in favour of Bohmian Mechanics and
against the application of Ockham's razor contra Bohmian Mechanics. By stan-
dard Quantum Mechanics, he means the Copenhagen Interpretation.
“One could say, that all additional things in Bohmian mechanics,
the particles and its trajectories, should fall victim to Ockham's ra-
zor. We believe this is a wrong conclusion. We believe that ontology
is nothing secondary, contrary it should be at the beginning of a the-
ory, and that Ockham's razor leaves behind a mutilated incomplete
description of things.”
or
“On one hand you have to accept that the description of measure-
ments need rules that are completely different from all other laws
even and cannot be derived from them. Already here fails the argu-
ment of Ockham's razor, standard quantum mechanics is not more
economic than Bohmian mechanics.”
Lucien Hardy argues in favour of hidden variables [Hardy, 2013]:
“It is very often argued that Ockham's razor should be applied here to
rule against introducing such hidden variable, but this rather depends
on how one interprets the objective of applying Ockham's razor and
the need to provide explanation. There are perhaps three reasons why
one might want to introduce hidden variables into quantum mechan-
ics: (1) to restore determinism (2) To provide a clear ontology (3)
To solve the measurement problem.”
Oliver Passon indicates in Passon [2004] that Ockham's razor is used in the
wrong direction and would actual favour Bohmian Mechanics:
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“...the deBroglie-Bohm theory supplements ordinary quantum me-
chanics by an equation-of-motion for the quantum-particles, but elim-
inates the postulates which are related to the measurement process(not
to mention how uncompelling those postulates are).”
and further
“Hence, it is questionable whether the precondition for applying Ock-
ham's razor is met.”
It is unclear what precondition Passon here refers to. The message still is clear;
to him, Ockham's razor cannot decide in favour of Copenhagen interpretation.
4.3 In favor of Copenhagen interpretation - against De
Broglie-Bohm Interpretation and Bohmian Mechanics
One more example of how Ockham's philosophy is used to argue in favour or
against a certain interpretation comes from Anton Zeilinger [Zeilinger, 2003,
p.151,152,154] when he speaks about Ockham's razor:
“It is the assumption, that one should not invent things, quantities
or entities without necessity.”
and
“William of Ockham was a medieval philosopher who wanted to cut
away all unnecessary things in philosophy.”
and
“An important argument against the quantum potential comes again
with Ockham's razor. If we can, what is indeed the case, explain just
as much as without the quantum potential, then it is redundant.”
Zeilinger [1996] furthermore argues in favour of Copenhagen interpretation:
“I have purposely not dealt with questions like: Is there a border be-
tween micro- and macro physics? Is a new form of logic necessary
for quantum processes? Has one’s awareness an active, dynamic
influence on the wave function? Such or similar positions were pro-
posed by several physicists, but in my opinion they would all fall
victim to Occam’s razor: Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter ne-
cessitatem. It is the beauty of the Copenhagen interpretation that it
operates with a minimal set of entities and concepts.”
22
4.4 In favor of Copenhagen Interpretation - against Many
Worlds Interpretation
Anton Zeilinger applies Ockham's razor also against the Many World Interpre-
tation [Zeilinger, 2003, p.151,152,154 ]:
“The Many-worlds interpretation violates a basic assumption, which
has been very successful in the past. Why should one invent so many
worlds, if there are other interpretations, which do the same without
them? ”
Nicolas Gisin [Gisin, 2013, p.5] argues against Many Worlds, but unfortunately
the reference in the paper refers not to the resource of the original critique:
“Years ago, I once argued that the many-worlds does not seem com-
patible with Occam’s razor principle. As answer I got the follow-
ing: “Occam’s razor should not be applied to the physical world, but
be applied to the Schroedinger equation; don’t add any term to this
beautiful equation”. The linearity of the Schroedinger equation was
assumed more real than our physical universe.”
4.5 In favor of Many Worlds Interpretation - against De
Broglie-Bohm Interpretation and Bohmian Mechanics
Hilary Greaves argues with Ockham's razor in favour of Many Worlds Interpre-
tation against the hidden variable approaches, which adresses the De Broglie-
Bohm Interpretation and Bohmian Mechanics [Greaves, 2007]:
“The motivations for the many-worlds interpretation include (i) the
fact that (if defensible) it solves the measurement problem, (ii) com-
patibility with the spirit of special relativity, and (iii) Ockham’s ra-
zor. ... There is no ’ontological extravagance’ in any offensive sense,
since nothing is being added at the fundamental level. (Indeed, the
fundamental ontology of this sort of many-worlds interpretation is
actually more parsimonious than that of the rival ’hidden variables’
approaches.”
Vaidman [2016] argues in favour of the Many Worlds interpretation against
Bohmian mechanics:
“The MWI is also more economic than Bohmian mechanics ,which
has in addition the ontology of the particle trajectories and the laws
which give their evolution.”
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4.6 In favor of De Broglie-Bohm Interpretation and Bohmian
Mechanics - against Many Worlds Interpretation
Valentini [2010] in a reply to claims that the Many Worlds interpretation in-
cludes the idea of De Broglie-Bohm Interpretation:
“However, since the de Broglie velocity field is single-valued, tra-
jectories q(t) cannot cross. There can be no splitting or fusion of
worlds. The above de Broglie-Bohm multiverse then has the same
kind of ‘trivial’ structure that would be obtained if one reified all the
possible trajectories for a classical test particle in an external field:
the parallel worlds evolve independently, side by side. Given such a
theory, on the grounds of Ockham’s razor alone, there would be a
conclusive case for taking only one of the worlds as real. ”
4.7 Other positions
The following citations cannot be assigned clearly to one of the previous groups,
but are relevant to our discussion. Specifically, the Mathematical Universe Hy-
pothesis is related to the Many Worlds interpretation. In our analysis we will
assign them to the same group and merge their points of view.
Arthur Fine argues with a counterfactual gedankenexperiment on the develop-
ment of Quantum Mechanics [Hardy, 2013, Arthur Fine - On the interpretation
of Bohmian Mechanics]:
“Given the entanglement of physics with positivistic philosophy in
the first half of this century, a process initiated by Einstein and rel-
ativity, we might embellish Cushings counterfactual history a bit.
We might conjecture that if Bohmian mechanics had indeed been the
first theory of the quantum domain, subsequent epistemological dis-
cussions might well have inspired at least some participants to wield
Occams razor to pare away everything that is not simply quantum
mechanics!”
Jannes [2009] with a critical remark on the Max Tegmarks Mathematical Uni-
verse Hypothesis (MUH):
“A classical argument against Platonism is that it unnecessarily com-
plicates our view of reality by requiring a commitment to the exis-
tence of an immense realm of mathematical and other abstract en-
tities, thereby violating Occams razor. This does not imply a denial
of the effectiveness of mathematics at describing (part of) reality.”
Tegmark [2004] with a statement concerning his Mathematical Universe Hy-
pothesis and the application of Ockham's razor to the Multiverse concepts. He
defends the Multiverse concept against Copenhagen interpretation and along
the way attacks the simplicity of the Copenhagen interpretation:
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“In short, the Level III multiverse, if it exists, adds nothing new
beyond Level I and Level II just more indistinguishable copies of the
same universes, the same old storylines playing out again and again
in other quantum branches. Postulating a yet unseen nonunitary
effect to get rid of the Level III multiverse, with Ockhams Razor in
mind, therefore would not make Ockham any happier.”
and
“The principal arguments against parallel universes are that they
are wasteful and weird, so let us consider these two objections in
turn. The first argument is that multiverse theories are vulnerable to
Ockhams razor, since they postulate the existence of other worlds that
we can never observe. Why should nature be so ontologically wasteful
and indulge in such opulence as to contain an infinity of different
worlds? Intriguingly, this argument can be turned around to argue
for a multiverse. When we feel that nature is wasteful, what precisely
are we disturbed about her wasting? Certainly not space, since the
standard flat universe model with its infinite volume draws no such
objections. Certainly not mass or atoms either, for the same reason
once you have wasted an infinite amount of something, who cares if
you waste some more? Rather, it is probably the apparent reduction
in simplicity that appears disturbing, the quantity of information
necessary to specify all these unseen worlds. However, as is discussed
in more detail in Tegmark (1996), an entire ensemble is often much
simpler than one of its members.”
Fuchs [2010] remarks concerning a specific aspect of QBism:
“The aim of physics is to find characteristics that apply to as much
of the world in its varied fullness as possible. However, those com-
mon characteristics are hardly what the world is made of - the world
instead is made of this and this and this.”
This statement does not address Ockham's razor, but it points out the position
of Ockham in the debate on universals; it is a nominalists point of view. It
is worthwhile to analyse if the characteristic of a position in the debate on
universals can be found in other interpretations as well. The scope would be
to answer whether it would take a realist position, which means in the context
of the problem of universals, a neutral position, and if this characteristic can
be used as a differentiation between interpretations. This will be done in a
subsequent paper.
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4.8 Analysis of applications of Ockhams razor
The presented meta-analysis cannot claim to be complete,as it did not cover all
journals or even a nameable subset of all relevant books in this field; nor can it
be used to draw quantitative conclusions, though it is a representative overview
of the status quo in the literature, reflects a remarkable situation and allows us
to draw conclusions.
In the above meta-analysis, Ockham's razor is used in nearly all constellations
by proponents of all positions. Positivist against realist point of view, realist
against positivist point of view, deterministic interpretation against indeter-
ministic interpretation, orthogonal interpretations arguing against each other.
Figure 5 shows the positions and their respective contradictions. It turns out
that they are all in contradiction to each other.
How is it possible that a principle that is meaningful to several advocates of
different viewpoints in the interpretational debate allows such contradictory
conclusions?
Figure 5: Contradictions in application of Ockham's razor
One of the problems of the application of Ockham's razor in general is that the
principle itself argues in favour of parsimony over plentifulness, in favour of sim-
plicity. And there it becomes difficult in our application to the interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics. As we have seen, the definition of simplicity is not a
standard one; even more in the above-cited viewpoints, it is rarely argued what
is meant by this simplicity, as if it was obvious. A resolution for this could be
to define a complexity measure of theories and then let the more simple theory
according to this measure (or in our case of interpretations of Quantum Me-
chanics, the more parsimonious interpretation) pass. It seems that the problem
then only shifts to the definition of this measure of complexity, which then will
become the heavily disputed topic. One could think that this leads into an end-
less self-referring circle with simplicity measures that refer to simplicity. On the
other hand, a measure for the complexity of an interpretation is an interesting
open question that should not be unconsidered.
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4.9 Ockhams razor and economy of thought
A different approach to this topic would be if we revisit the original idea of Ock-
ham's razor as something of common sense, as an idea of economy of thought.
This idea can be found in social psychology as well.
Wegener and Petty [1998] gives a review of the social psychology model of the
naive scientist (Heider et al. [1958]). The idea is that humans perceive their
environment like naive scientists and make attributions to phenomena.
The naive scientist model got under attack over the years and has been replaced
by the cognitive miser model, which argues that humans make indeed make use
of several heuristics on their judging on certain facts, but the focus lies on the
efficiency of the decision process [Fiske and Taylor, 2013]:
“Hence the third general view of the thinker is the cognitive miser
model. The idea is that people are limited in their capacity to process
information, so they take shortcuts whenever they can. People adopt
strategies that simplify complex problems; the strategies may not be
correct or produce correct answers, but they emphasize efficiency.
The capacity-limited thinker searches for rapid, adequate solutions
rather than for slow, accurate solutions.”
Tversky and Kahneman [1973] remark on the methods of application of the
different heuristics:
“ Little is known, however about the frequency of classes or the like-
lihood of events. We propose that when faced with the difficult task
if judging probability or frequency, people employ a limited number
of heuristics which reduce these judgements to simpler ones.”
and
“We suggest that in evaluating the probability of complex events only
the simplest and most available scenarios are likely to be considered.”
We see a deep connection between the cognitive miser model in social psychol-
ogy and Ockham's razor in the way Ockham understood it, as a concept of
common sense, as an economy of thought.
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We conclude that the remarkable situation of contradictory statements concern-
ing the simplicity of interpretations is due to the inapplicability of Ockham's
razor in the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. This inapplicability reflects
in the contradictions between the different viewpoints in the interpretations of
Quantum Mechanics, which shows that there is no preferred direction in how
Ockham's razor is used, and it seems that it is up to subjectivity as to how it is
applied. It therefore seems arbitrary how Ockham's razor is applied here at all,
which allows doubts for the value Ockham's razor can have in the discussion on
the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.
As long as there is no quantitative system that allows to account for simplicity
in that regime, we are forced to rely on subjective judgements if Ockham's razor
is used reasonably in that specific case. We think that this is not an appropri-
ate scientific method, but merely a matter of taste. As scientists, we should be
very careful and alert when applying Ockham's razor, especially if we adopt it
as a first order principle, since the analysis of its historical origin showed that
Ockham's razor is just a concept of economy of thought and not a concept of
simplicity of nature, which is also supported by social psychology.
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5 A new diversity - conclusion
We have come a long way from the medieval philosophy and its peculiarities
to the disputes on identity, which are still an open question in the diverse field
of the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. We questioned the applicability
of Ockham's razor to the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics and concluded
that no clear scheme can be seen as to how Ockham's razor should contribute in
a positive way to the ongoing discussions. This is certainly owed to the notion
of simplicity, which is merely a subjective quality and seems to be a relative
concept.
Alluding to the Great Cosmological Controversy again, we claim that there is
an analogy18to the current situation in the interpretations of Quantum Me-
chanics. In the case of the cosmological models, we encounter two orthogonal
world-views, but overlapping in the empirical predictions of the models 19 that
rival for being accepted as the “true” theory. As argued before in the discussion
on the Ontological Coherence Argument, each position claimed simplicity as an
argument for its world-view, underpinning it with significant arguments.
It turned out that the heliocentric model delivered a world view that had striking
advantages, but when relativity arose at the begin of the 20th Century the Great
Cosmological Controversy was seen under a new perspective. The remarkable
situation that it was not a trivial task to decide between these two models
turned out to have a reason, in the fact that both models are applicable due to
the relativity principle, and the question for truth if the sun or the earth rested
turned out to be meaningless. In Quantum Mechanics, we are in the exceptional
situation that we face several interpretations that are in full agreement with
the experimental predictions but are completely orthogonal in their ontological
statements and implications, even with respect to diverse aspects of the world
views.20 We conclude out of this situation in the field of the interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics that we have an analogy to the Great Cosmological
Controversy.
18Though there are clearly different situations concerning the mathematical framework.
19With respect to the experimental limitations of that time.
20Such aspects of interpretations which show orthogonal behavior are Determinism-
Indeterminism, Locality-Nonlocality, Nominalism - Platonism, Objectivity - Subjectivity,
Uniqueness - Ambiguity
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Is this situation not an indication that should encourage us to think that a
dogmatic dispute with one winner might not be the solution of the problem?
One can believe that the current situation in Quantum Mechanics can be un-
derstood that way and that this situation can be interpreted as a perspective
on the new physics that may lie ahead, indicating that our well-established con-
cepts of quantum-objects, spacetime, determinism, probability and information
will be challenged. Even more, it seems that our philosophy of science will be
challenged. Quantum logic showed that even the propositions of logic can be
involved in the ambiguous story of Quantum Mechanics [Mittelstaedt, 1978]. To
underpin the importance of this ambiguousness, we call this quality of Quantum
Mechanics “Quambiguity”
Figure 6: Quambiguity
In any case, we want to conclude that Ockham's razor cannot solve this mys-
tery in a swift way. It is a concept of parsimony of thought, but was not meant
to give a guideline that nature has to be simple in principle. It originates in
the economy of thought that is an implication of the limited resources of our
cognitive skills, which reflects in well-known heuristics in social psychology. For
Ockham himself, the principle was a heuristic of common sense that helped him
in his line of argument against Platonism, against a realist position in the de-
bate on the universals. He used the razor to get rid of a not necessarily needed
multiplicity of entities.
In context with Quantum Mechanics, Ockham's razor should encourage us to
reconsider the principles and mechanism of our thinking and reasoning, our
judging about certain theories, world-views and mindsets, and our prejudices.
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A Appendix - Arguing with the scholastic method
Using Ockham's discussion on universals from his Opera Theologica II [of Ock-
ham, 2012, OT II, Liber I, D.2 Q.4, page 100] the structure of the scholastic
tradition can be seen quite well in the following example.
We follow the translation from [Spade, 1994]. Ockham there poses the ques-
tion:
“Question 4: Is a universal a thing outside the soul, in individuals,
really distinct from them, and not multiplied in individuals?”
Then he argues in favour of the position that affirms the question:
“(1) As for the identity and distinction of God from creature, it must
be asked whether there is something univocal common to God and
creature and essentially predicable of both. But because this question,
along with much of what has already been said and is about to be said
in the following questions, depends on a knowledge of univocal and
universal nature, there fore in order to clarify what has been and will
be said I will first ask some questions about universal and univocal
nature.
(2) On this, I first ask whether what is immediately and proximately
denominated by a universal and univocal intention [K Ch. 23] is
truly some thing outside the soul, intrinsic and essential to what it
is common and univocal to, and really distinct from them. (3) Yes
it is:
(4) First, it is truly a thing, essential and intrinsic to what it is
common to.
...”
He then presents the view of his opposer, who he calls “Doctori Subtili”[of Ock-
ham, 2012, OT II, Liber I, D.2 Q.4, page 100]. Some researchers assume that he
refers to Duns Scotus, and some would argue that the view he presents would
better represent Walter Burleys ideas [Spade, 1994, page 115]:
“ Walter Burleys view - Opinio Doctori Subtili Imposita
(8) On this question there is one theory that says every univocal
universal is a certain thing existing outside the soul, really in each
singular and belong ing to the essence of each singular, really distinct
from each singular and from any other universal, in such a way that
the universal man is truly one thing outside the soul, existing really
in each man, and is really distinguished from each man and from the
universal animal and from the universal sub stance.
...”
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Following an extensive argumentation in favour on this view a not less extensive
list of arguments against it is presented:
“Against this theory - Contra Opinonem Doctori Subtili Impositam
(34) This view is absolutely false and absurd. So I argue against
it.
(35) First: No thing one in number, not varied or multiplied, is
in several sensible supposita or singulars, or for that matter in any
created individuals, at one and the same time. But a thing such as
this theory postulates, if it were granted, would be one in number.
Therefore, it would not be in several singulars and belong to their
essence.
...”
Now Ockham presents his own views
“Ockham's own theory - Opinio Auctoris
(95) Therefore, in reply to the question [(2)], I say otherwise: No
thing really distinct from singular things and intrinsic to them is
universal or common to them. For such a thing is not to be posited
except (a) to preserve the one’s essential predication of the other,
or (b) to preserve our knowledge of things and (c) the definitions
of things. Aristotle, [Metaphysics XIII.4, 1078,2734], suggests these
reasons for Plato’s theory.
...”
followed by replies to the before presented theories:
“Replies to the arguments in favor of Burley’s theory - Ad Argu-
menta Opinionis Doctori Subtili Impositae
(111) To the other theorys first argument
...”
and
“Reply to the preliminary arguments - Responsio Ad Argumenta
Principalia
(184) To the first main argument [(4)], I reply: The universal man
and a particular man are essentially one is literally false.
...”
The scholastic method is a completely different way of arguing than what we
are used to nowadays. To modern eyes, it appears in some sense excessive and
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inefficient, though it prepared the ground for modern scientific reasoning, which
is built on hypotheses, induction, deduction, and discussion.
For more details concerning the scholastic method, refer to [Kretzmann et al.,
1982]. There, a summary and detailed presentation of the scholastic method
and its historical embedding is given.
B Appendix - Modern views on the Contradic-
tion principle, the notion of identity and in-
distinguishability
Ockham's Contradiction principle has some predecessors and modern represen-
tations, and pervaded the history of philosophy in different representations and
names. It would exceed the scope of this paper to give an overview that could
claim to be complete. Therefore, a certain selection is presented that seems
particular relevant to the author in context of this discussion to demonstrate
the application of Ockham's razor.
Whitehead and Russell are prominent for their attempt to put mathematics on
a logical basis. In this canon, the law of Non-Contradiction also found its place
[Whitehead and Russell, 1912, p.117 *3,24]:
` ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
Two contradictory propositions cannot both be true. In the context of propo-
sitions about the properties of objects, difference can be posed through con-
tradiction. This argument and application of Contradiction is found later in
Wittgenstein [1994] which refers to this principle several times. See [Wittgen-
stein, 1994, 2.0233 and 2.02331]:
“If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction be-
tween them, apart from their external properties, is that they are
different.”
“Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we
can immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others
and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things that
have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is
quite impossible to indicate one of them. For if there is nothing to
distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it would
be distinguished after all.”
or at a different place [Wittgenstein, 1994, 5.53, 5.5301, 5.5302, 5.5303]:
“Identity of the object I express by identity of the sign and not by
means of a sign of identity. Difference of the objects by difference of
the signs.”
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“It is self-evident that identity is not a relation between objects. This
becomes very clear if one considers, for example, the proposition
(x) : fx. ⊂ .x = a. What this proposition says is simply that only a
satisfies the function f, and not that only things that have a certain
relation to a satisfy the function. Of course, it might then be said
that only a did have this relation to a; but in order to express that,
we should need the identity-sign itself.”
“Russell’s definition of ’=’ is inadequate, because according to it we
cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common.
(Even if this proposition is never correct, it still has sense.)”
“Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is
nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to
say nothing at all.”
The laws of contradiction are always in connection with the question of identity
of objects, beginning with the pre-Socratics and their philosophy of substance
and matter. Aristotle based this and, of course, his own philosophical ideas on
logical foundations that still pervade our thinking. In classical physics, the iden-
tity of physical objects seemed clearly defined, but the foundational questions
have there have been already covered by the operational success Newtonian
Mechanics offered. When Quantum Mechanics arose, those philosophical ques-
tions became significant again in physics because of their sudden experimental
accessibility and support by measurements on the microscopical scale.
The individuality and nature of quantum objects became a striking question of
quantum philosophy, starting at the statistical mechanics involving Quantum
Mechanics. By neglecting the identity of permuted particles, the experimentally
confirmed laws of statistical mechanics have been found. It is an interesting ob-
servation that physics and philosophy develop in a kind of entangled way and
stimulate each other.
Quantum mechanics kept the topic of identity challenging up to now, as can
be seen by ongoing discussions on the definition and interpretation of identity,
individuality and indistinguishability [Krause and Arenhart, 2014]; [Da Costa
and Lombardi, 2014];[Dieks, 2014]. For an account of individuality in the Bohm
interpretation, refer to [Pylkka¨nen et al., 2014].
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